18 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |